Zamyatin\u27s We and the Idea of the Dystopie by Mikesell, Margaret Lael & Suggs, Jon Christian
Studies in 20th Century Literature 
Volume 7 Issue 1 Article 8 
9-1-1982 
Zamyatin's We and the Idea of the Dystopie 
Margaret Lael Mikesell 
John Jay College, City University, New York 
Jon Christian Suggs 
John Jay College, City University, New York 
Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl 
 Part of the Modern Literature Commons, and the Russian Literature Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Mikesell, Margaret Lael and Suggs, Jon Christian (1982) "Zamyatin's We and the Idea of the Dystopie," 
Studies in 20th Century Literature: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 8. https://doi.org/10.4148/2334-4415.1117 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Studies in 20th Century Literature by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information, 
please contact cads@k-state.edu. 
Zamyatin's We and the Idea of the Dystopie 
Abstract 
An examination of We clarifies conventions for the dystopic novel even as it reveals that We transcends 
those conventions. Under the surface text, which presents a narrative of political and "romantic" struggle, 
lie subtexts exploring the personal and ideological implications of the conflict between reason and 
emotion. Analysis of these texts, seen in a New Comedy framework informed by elements of irony and 
romance, demonstrates that on every level the novel fails to reach comic resolution. Moreover, it is this 
very failure that marks the departure of We from the conventions of the dystopic novel. Like Brave New 
World and 1984, We contains satire and an obvious dystopia. However, it does not contain the other 
convention defining the genre—a recognizable and accessible moral norm. Rather, it depicts two 
dysfunctional Utopian systems in conflict. In transcending the conventions of the dystopic novel and in 
offering only partial resolution outside of its own flawed and mutually exclusive worlds, We explores the 
contradictions of the "modern" experience. 
Keywords 
dystopic novel, dystopia, ideology, identity, reason, emotion, Zamyatin, we, Brave New World, 1984, satire, 
utopian, modern experience 
This article is available in Studies in 20th Century Literature: https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol7/iss1/8 
ZAMYATIN'S WE AND THE IDEA 
OF THE DYSTOPIC 
Margaret Lael Mikesell and Jon Christian Suggs 
John Jay College, City University, New York 
One of the more uncomfortable cultural perspectives of our time 
forces us to realize that while the nineteenth century was one of 
utopian and thus comic enthusiasms, the twentieth has been the 
century of dystopic and ironic mechanisms. Revolutions as well as 
lovers find themselves among the constantly betrayed. In Western 
literature this condition is reflected in the fact that, although the 
utopian novel makes an occasional appearance after 1919, the literary 
expression of belief in a realizable utopian goal has been virtually 
replaced in the twentieth century by the dystopic novel. Indeed, to 
the modern reader all political novels seem dystopic. But such 
categorizing, however born out of whatever despair, can be mis- 
leading and some attempt needs to be made to sketch out the limits 
of the idea of the dystopic. 
Such an exercise here focuses on Yevgeny Zamyatin's We, 
generally considered the prototypical dystopic novel.' In fact, We is 
not a dystopic novel at all, despite its attention to dystopian societies. 
The terms dystopic and dystopia are properly literary rather than 
political, a dystopic novel being a type of satirical novel which shows 
life in a dysfunctional utopia and a dystopia the literary characteri- 
zation of a dysfunctional utopia. Although dystopias are not limited 
in their occurrence to the dystopic novel, they exist only in the 
literary works which frame them and have no actual identity in the 
phenomenal world of people and governments. In general, the por- 
trayal of a dystopia is carried forward by the satirization of 
elements of the imagined society which the author intends to be seen 
as manifestations of its dysfunction rather than as sources of it. 
Specifically in dystopic novels, the characterization is enhanced by 
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the counterpositioning to the dysfunctional society of a more desirable 
and manifestly more humane society which represents a morally 
acceptable world to the reader. 
In fact, these conditions do not appear in We. As close reading 
and analysis will show, a multiplicity of comic texts permeated with 
irony and informed by romance combine to make We more than a 
simple indictment of a political or social philosophy. Attention to the 
actual nature of the texts will give a fuller sense of the complexities of 
Zamyatin's work and a clearer sense of the dimensions and limita- 
tions of the dystopic novel. 
In brief, the book appears to be a journal kept by mathematician- 
engineer D-503, whose rocket ship, the Integral, is to carry the 
gospel of the One State to the stars. D's journal is to be part of that 
gospel and he promises his extraterrestrial readers to be faithfully 
honest to his experience of life in a rational, collective society. As D 
brings the Integral close to completion, however, the journal records 
his personal disintegration. Some atavistic appetite for emotional 
freedom is aroused in him by the woman 1-330, who is a secret agent 
for a revolutionary group known as the Mephi. D falls "madly" - 
there is no other word for it-and possessively in love with her, and 
she appears to manipulate this illegal passion for the revolutionary 
aims of her group, which rest on her plan to capture the spaceship. 
Following the failure of the plot, D is manipulated by the Benefactor, 
head of the One State, into betraying 1-330 and her comrades. After 
her execution, D lives on, lobotomized by the state in its attempt to 
control the chaos generated by the aborted rebellion. 
These events are set within the contrasting worlds of the One 
State (the Glass World) and the Green World, which exists beyond 
the wall enclosing the One State. The man-made Glass World 
operates by the application of rationality to human social interac- 
tion, while the natural Green World celebrates sensation and emotion. 
The One State is governed by an intricate system which determines 
virtually all of the conduct of its citizens and is concerned only with 
extending existing controls. In contrast, the social and political lives 
of the denizens of the Green World are anarchistic and unstructured. 
The developing conflict between these two worlds becomes the 
matter of D's journal and its narrative comprises the surface text of 
the novel. However, beneath the surface text are two subtexts which 
scrutinize an equally crucial conflict, that between the personal and 
ideological demands of reason and emotion. By placing these opposi- 
tions in the experience of one character, the multiple texts of the 2




novel not only find their dramatic center but reveal the complexity of 
the classic-romantic dialogue to which the twentieth century has fallen 
heir and out of which the utopian-dystopian dichotomy has risen. 
These conflicts and their consequence, the failure to achieve 
personal, social or ideological integrity, dictate the formal nature of 
the novel. The impulses toward resolution are set in a New Comedy 
framework with a rather traditional pattern of comic conflict for 
surface and subtext: two disparate elements need integration but are 
blocked by some absurd condition or law and enlist the aid of a tricky 
servant figure to finds ways through or around the absurd condition. 
However, the comic resolution is stopped short on every level of We, 
with the ironic distance from integration differing for each level. The 
multiple texts are best described as conflict patterns expressed as 
ironic comedy informed by themes of romance. 
In the surface text, D-503' s desire for the integration of his illicit 
love for 1-330 with his social identity as a citizen of the One State, 
and his efforts to achieve that goal, make up the world of valued 
action for the comedy; the attempted movement is, as usual, from an 
absurd society to the desired world of love and harmony. In We, 
however, as in all ironic comedy, this movement is initiated but the 
grotesque world prevails and the desired world of the lovers is never 
realized. The irony is intensified by the general tendency of such 
comedy to throw its main emphasis onto blocking forces and the 
futile struggle to identify them, rather than forward, as in romantic 
comedy, onto scenes of reconciliation and union. 
In We this tendency is expressed in variations of traditional New 
Comedy roles and devices which involve the portrayal of 1-330 as 
the nominal but demonic heroine, of the figure of the Benefactor as no 
mere bumbling, rigid senex iratus but as the "projection of a human 
will to tyranny,"2 and of the concierge of D's domicile as a tricky 
servant whose manipulations lead to the arrest and destruction of the 
"lovers." The cognitio, or scene of comic recognition, becomes the 
agony of I-330's torture under the mindless gaze of the lobotomized 
D-503; and the festive ritual, formalizing the accession of the lovers 
to the center of the new order, becomes the ritual execution of 1-330 
and her followers in the aftermath of their failed rebellion against the 
old order. Thus the absurd world is maintained-and revealed as not 
only absurd, but demonic. 
This reading of the surface text as ironic comedy does not 
account for the total complexity of the novel, nor for the failure of the 
comic purpose toward which D-503 and 1-330 seem to have been 3
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driving. Other texts extend the meaning of this narrative, exploring 
the psychological and ideological implications of its actions, again 
within the structures of ironic comedy. 
The first of these comic texts delineates D-503's struggle to 
recognize and integrate the irrational and emotional part of his 
psyche with his rational, collective self. In this internalized comic 
process, the two sides of D's personality represent the separated 
lovers, and the absurd condition preventing their union is the 
endorsement of reason by the One State as the sole foundation for 
personal and civic life. Initially, the definitive nexus for D is his 
rational self and the state, but through the catalytic presence of 1-330 
as some tricky servant of the psyche, a competing nexus, one between 
D's reason and imagination, is adumbrated. This potential integra- 
tion, which would betoken the successful comic resolution of this 
subtext, the victory of the "I" over the "we," is frustrated as 1-330 
imposes yet a third nexus-between D's emerging self and her 
dominant personality. 
As the novel opens, the unquestioned and complete dominion of 
reason in D's mind makes him the perfect product, and subject, of the 
state. In all phases of his life, D relies on the exactitudes of reason- 
time pieces, probabilities, "ethics based on subtraction, addition, 
division, and multiplication."' His conscious mind having been 
harnessed by the state, it is the unconscious and the non-reasoning 
part of D which awakens, prodded by 1-330, and which becomes the 
other half of the comic equation in this subtext. Using state jargon, D 
identifies this "new" part of himself, which intrudes in the form of 
dreams, fantasies and irrational impulses, as the "imagination" or 
"soul," in the state's eyes an illness to be diagnosed and then 
extirpated. 
However, only through acknowledging this buried self can 
D-503 achieve autonomy. This becomes clear during a brief sojourn 
in the Green World, a locale which nurtures precisely those aspects 
of the psyche suppressed by the state. Enthusiastically endorsing 
"madness" at the Mephi's rock altar, he can see himself for the 
moment differentiated from the vast regiment of numbers on whom he 
usually relies for self-definition. But such insights have no cumulative 
effect despite their recurrence and he cannot act upon them. Their 
impact is registered only on the reader who, answering D's 
unanswered questions and completing his ellipses, recognizes the 
projected termini of his growth-integration and autonomy-without 
D himself having such awareness. 4




The early promise of psychic integration for D, and its ultimate 
failure, are both effected by 1-330, who in this subtext plays the role 
of tricky servant as she entices D beyond the boundaries of state 
dogma and value.4 The illegality of their love offers him a release 
from the "unfreedom" of thought and action promulgated by the One 
State and allows him to approach his individuality. Yet his love, 
potentially such a creative force for him, ultimately produces one of 
those "innumerable stupid tragedies" from which the "ancients" 
were thought to have suffered. 
In traditional comic processes, love is the organizing principle 
on which the emergent society establishes itself. Exemplified in the 
relationship between the hero and heroine, this love generally 
includes reciprocity, respect for human dignity, and forgiveness; 
it replaces the lust, power or psychopathology on which the absurd 
society has been based. However, love itself is essentially powerless 
to act in its own behalf while the absurd society holds sway. It is, 
rather, manipulation of that society which obviates obstacles-a 
manipulation which is usually directed by the subversive genius of 
the tricky servant figure. In comedy, love does not conquer all; 
chicanery does. 
In the ironic subtext of D's psychic struggle, however, "love" 
itself becomes a manipulative device in the hands of the tricky 
servant. 1-330 encourages in D a love that is irrational, possessive 
and personally demeaning. It does not follow the pattern of egalitarian 
reciprocity celebrated in Shakespeare's romantic comedies. Rather, 
echoing the tradition of Courtly Love, 1-330 requires of D-503 his 
total submission, a demand which he embraces: "She used the 
ancient, long-forgotten `thou'-the 'thou' of the master to the 
slave. . . . Yes I was a slave, and this, too, was necessary, was good" 
(64). D's fledgling ego, even as it is nurtured by 1-330, undergoes a 
marked attenuation: "I was dissolved, I was infinitely small, I was 
a point . . ." (129). This process is accompanied by the equally 
traditional symptoms of sensitivity and jealousy, products of the 
uncertainty which 1-330 builds into the structure of their relationship. 
Thus while love catalyzes the emergence of D's buried self, ultimately 
it destroys rather than affirms personality because it demands not an 
autonomous, fully integrated person but a submissive Courtly Lover. 
This submission, masked as a love tied completely to the "soul" 
or "imagination" of his atavistic self and keyed automatically to the 
appearance of 1-330 in all of her roles or guises, cannot be a part of 
any comic resolution involving the integration of D's emotions and 5
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rationality. Such a resolution must entail "an awakening to self- 
knowledge, which is typically a release from humor or a mechanical 
form of repetitive behavior." The absurd humor is not obliterated, but 
"transformed into an inner source of coherence."' The reverse 
happens in this ironic comedy; manipulating the humor of excessive 
rationality which promotes D-503's loyal citizenship in the One 
State, 1-330 solicits from him an equally mechanical submission to 
her will. His humor, so far from being transformed into an "inner 
source of coherence," is the very stimulus to his eventual betrayal of 
his own humanity. Torn between the mutually exclusive demands of 
reason (the Benefactor) and imagination (1-330), D-503 eventually 
seeks to obliterate all consciousness through the Operation, ending as 
a "humanoid tractor" possessing neither reason nor imagination. 
Although the events that signal the end of this comic subtext 
coincide with those of the surface text, they must be read somewhat 
differently. Here, the torture and death of 1-330 are not those that 
obliterate the heroine from a comic equation as in the ironic close of 
the surface text. They are, rather, the ultimate punishment of the 
failed tricky servant. In most New Comedy, there is antagonism 
between the senex iratus and the tricky servant who seeks to gull him 
for the sake of the young lovers, but the senex is never allowed to 
make good on his blustery threats of pain and annihilation. However, 
in the ironic world of this subtext, 1-330 is a demonic variant of the 
tricky servant who is betrayed to the equally demonic Benefactor by 
the "lovers" she has pretended to serve. D-503's betrayal of 1-330 
intensifies the irony, because it has been stimulated by the jealousy 
accompanying the total submission to her personality which she has 
fostered in him. 
In the subtext we have just discussed, the illusion that 1-330 
facilitates D's growth is systematically discredited by the destructive 
effects of the love she demands. Her function slides from that of some 
demonic tricky servant to that of a shadowy blocking humor; finally 
she is not a facilitator but, like the Benefactor himself, a tyrant. 
The implications of her role transformation become clear in a 
discussion of a second comic subtext, one in which D-503 is the 
figure whose manipulation of the absurd world is necessary to effect a 
resolution of antagonistic forces and bring about a new society. That 
he fails to do so as a consequence of his inability to integrate reason 
and emotion is the linchpin of cause and effect that links those two 
subtexts of ironic bondage. 
In the second subtext of We, the comic equation changes. The 6




fundamental problem is the desire of the Green World to subsume the 
Glass World. The two worlds are, in effect, the isolated "lovers," 
separated physically by the Green Wall and ideologically by their 
mutually exclusive dependencies on reason and emotion. Although 
D-503 is one of the separated "lovers" of the surface text, and he 
contains both lovers in the psychomachia of the subtext we have just 
discussed, it is his role as engineer of the Integral which fixes him 
here as tricky servant. He is, as we have seen, truly enslaved to both 
worlds, through passion on one hand and socialization on the other. 
And he alone can manipulate the physical world in order to shatter the 
exclusivity of the ideologies which divide it. 
This subtext is propelled by the conventions of romance. The 
myth of the victory of summer over winter, the delineation of the world 
of innocence rather than experience and the rhythm of movement 
from a "real" to a "green" world and back again are all present. But 
they function so ironically that their near-demonic perspective makes 
futile the struggle toward the wedding of two worlds. 
In traditional myths of the defeat of winter, summer is represented 
as a fecund female. But in We, summer's imago is the sharp-visaged, 
sharp-toothed presence of 1-330 as vagina dentata, not earth 
mother. Nor is hers a world of innocence, but one of decadence, 
characterized by the Ancient House, rank growth at the foot of the 
Green Wall, mad masses in the dark forest and secret passages in the 
bowels of the city. 
D-503 comes to this "romantic" world in a demonic parody of the 
rhythms of romantic comedy in which no conversion takes place; this 
is no faerie world of a midsummer night's dream. At the meeting of 
the Mephi in the forest outside the wall, he embraces madness but 
remains oblivious to its implications. He experiences a singular sense 
of self, but on return to the "real" world of the One State forgets his 
pledge to act for the Mephi. When 1-330 comes to him with a pro- 
gram for revolution, D is shattered at the betrayal of the One State 
which his role entails. He can only think of escaping with 1-330, back 
to the Green World beyond the Wall. He cannot see that she seeks no 
haven there; it is the city, and its destruction, that she wants. 
That he can be blind to this truth about her suggests the key to 
his failure as tricky servant in this subtext. His commitment to action 
is grounded in his passion for her and not in the idea of freedom against 
tyranny. In fact, he cannot respond to concepts of "freedom" from 
beyond the Wall in any fundamental manner as long as she circum- 
scribes his emotional development with a demand for submission as 7
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strong as that of the One State. And if D cannot attain true self- 
knowledge and thence true love, the Mephi must fail, for in a struggle 
for D's submissive soul, 1-330 must lose to the One State. Convinced 
by the Benefactor of I-330's exploitation of his love, D-503 confesses 
to the Guardians, at once killing the self that loved 1-330, submitting 
to that competing force, the One State, and assuring failure of the 
revolution. Thus D's inability to achieve personal integration, evident 
in the first subtext, prevents him from fulfilling the revolutionary aims 
of the Mephi, which would have completed the comic action of this 
subtext. 
The foregoing discussion of surface and subtexts in We exposes 
the many levels of defeat on which the novel ends. The suggestion in 
the first subtext that the alternative which 1-330 offers D is not 
freedom from enslavement but one tyranny in place of another raises 
questions about the novel's thematic juxtapositions-questions which 
are not allayed by the fact that in the second subtext the comic plot 
again seems to promise less a victory over than an exchange of 
tyrannies. Light can be cast on these apparent contradictions when we 
examine some basic assumptions about the nature of the dystopic 
novel. 
The dystopic novel, we have already argued, is a form of satiric 
novel, the object of whose attack is the dystopia or dysfunctioning 
utopia. The specific targets of the dystopic novel's satire are elements 
of the dystopia that manifest its dysfunction rather than explain its 
origins, and the general nature of its dysfunctions is put into high 
relief by the presence of alternative, and clearly preferable, modes of 
action and/or systems of belief or organization. 
Although We contains satiric elements and an obvious dystopia, 
it is significantly different from true dystopic novels, those which, as 
true satires, contain recognizable and accessible moral norms.6 Brave 
New World and 1984 are generally cited as examples of this type. In 
Brave New World the norm is objectified in the characterization of 
the Savage, John, and in 1984 in the atavistic concerns of Winston 
Smith. But there are no analogous values in the systemic subtext of 
We, where the dystopic Glass World is opposed by the forces opera- 
ting out of the Green World. If the moral norms of satire ought to be 
relatively clear so that standards for measure are available to the 
reader, what and where are those norms in this book? Are they found 
in democracy or capitalism? These ideas reside outside the satire- 
indeed, outside the novel. And what of the Green World? While in 
this context it is Nature, the rebels it houses seem demonic and 8




their leader as much an alazon, as much an imposter, as the 
Benefactor.' 
We, instead of fitting the model of a dystopic novel by presenting 
a dysfunctional utopia and using the revolutionary and romantic forces 
of the Green World as counterpoints to totalitarianism, actually 
presents two dysfunctional utopian systems in conflict. One of these, 
the One State of the Glass World, is partially based on a Marxian 
view of history and is the subject of the overt satire of the book. The 
other, that rudimentary world for which the Mephi and the Green 
World stand, is non-ideological and romantic, and although it could 
be mistaken for the normative world of value, it is itself undermined 
through the ironic and demonic nature of its depiction. 
The importance of the portrayal of the Glass World lies not so 
much in the specificity of its satire-petroleum-based food, rampant 
Taylorism, machine music, governmental sophistry, terror, torture, 
and the absence of personal freedom-as in its "recording" of the 
experiential failure of a Marxian view of history. This view pre- 
supposes an early homogeneous organization of human experience, 
a "pre-contract" society which has given way to a heterogeneous 
"contract" society marked by a complex division of labor and by 
human alienation. This will in turn give way to a technologically 
advanced but spiritually reintegrated society, a telotic future that uses 
the phenomenology of the "present" to aid in the restitution of the 
spiritual homogeneity of the ancient, pre-contract society.' In the 
Marxian version of the telotic world, the state, an agency called into 
being by one class, usually a minority, to enable it to dominate the 
majority, will eventually "wither away" as class distinctions vanish 
into the classless society. 
However, the future Zamyatin presents in We has not followed 
Marxian rules. A collective, classless society has existed for one 
thousand years, as D-503 lets us see by reproducing in his journal a 
proclamation from the One State Gazette. Yet the very existence of 
the Gazette presents us with the paradox: the state has not withered 
away; it has increasingly dominated the lives of its citizens through 
the application of scientific principles. The story D tells us is, in part, 
that of the struggle between the entropic One State, which stands for 
one failed utopian vision, and the Mephi of the Green World and their 
natural processes, which represent yet another. 
This latter vision describes an alternate world to that of the 
collective state, one presumed valuable for its submission to natural 
processes rather than to design. The romantically conceived Green 9
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World is itself a utopian vision, but one that directs its attention 
contra the vision of other literary utopias of the modern period. 
Christopher Collins has suggested that the rebels against the One 
State look back to the romantically-oriented utopias favored in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and that Zamyatin be considered 
one of the first writers to direct twentieth-century Western utopian 
thought to these models. However, there is a significant difference 
between their characterization by Collins as "small, self-sufficient, 
economically primitive communities, where the individual, free from 
the inevitably corrupting influence of institutions and civilization, 
might realize his natural goodness and kindness," and the world 
desired by 1-330 and her Mephi.9 
That world is not so much natural as it is mad, not as individualist- 
ic as it is primitively anarchic, and if the examples of 1-330 and her 
followers, whose collective name is a contraction of Mephistopheles, 
are to be taken as object lessons, it harbors not kindness or goodness 
but violence and deceit. Nor does D-503 get arguments for economic 
or personal autonomy from 1-330. The world of the rebels is not polit- 
ical or social, any more than Romanticism is politically or socially 
specific. 
On a more fundamental level, the Mephi represent a vision of 
history that is in conflict with the concept of the irrevocable material 
progress of history as expressed in Marxian thought and exemplified 
in its dysfunctional form as the One State. The utopian vision which 
guides 1-330 and her fellow conspirators looks to the past, to a Golden 
Age that can be regained phenomenologically as well as spiritually 
through revolution. Once the revolution has been recreated, 1-330 
argues, the energy which represents its value immediately begins to 
disappear into an increasingly entropic future and more revolution 
becomes necessary. But her fetishistic use of the symbols of the past 
and her arguments for the dismantling of the Glass World bespeak 
the desire to recapture the essence of the past by returning to its 
physical reality, to react against the present in search of a perfect past, 
rather than to act with it in pursuit of a telotic future. 
Thus We does not depict one dystopic society that by rights should 
be replaced by a normative world of value on which we as readers 
can agree. Rather the novel presents two unacceptable organizations 
of experience. One, some failed collectivist vision that has led to a 
tyranny of acquiescence, is opposed by a reactionary impulse toward 
a natural anarchy that suggests a vision, attenuated by its own anti- 
historical bias, of a previous Golden Age of limited but free societies. 10




One offers order but no freedom; the other offers freedom as the 
denial of order. 
The use of the mechanisms of comedy to portray this conflict 
precludes any reading of the texts as merely satiric or dystopic. By 
following comic convention, particularly the rhythmic movements of 
romantic comedy, the novel places a world of formless energy in 
opposition to a structured society. The One State must be replaced, if 
the Mephi are to have their way, with the universal forces of 
change. These forces promote no real social structure, not only 
because they are the elements of a romantic vision of universal 
principles, but because in comedy rigidity and definition belong to the 
usurpers and blocking humors who want predictable activity. In We, 
those humors are the principles of the Glass World. Thus D's 
"conversion" scene in the Green World assembly produces no 
political vision in part because romantic comedy has no component 
to match the structures of the "real" world. Casting a counter-utopia 
in the structure of romantic comedy and giving that utopian vision no 
social component makes a dialectical solution apparently unrealizable, 
since comedy seems to abhor the presence of mutually exclusive 
stances.10 The ability of the tricky servant to function as manipulator 
and mediator depends upon the potentiality of the absurd law to be 
altered, of the blocking humor to bend, even to disappear. 
The novel does offer two very partial resolutions which, though 
suggestive, leave untouched its central dialectical problems wherein 
two dystopian visions appear, one emerging in response to the 
existential fact of the other. There is a comic resolution of sorts which 
comes not through the alteration of the absurd world but through its 
transcendence, in the portrayal of 0-90, D's other lover. Her 
criticism of One State excesses suggests her independence from its 
dogmas, and her leitmotifs, the love of flowers, the expanding womb, 
connect her with the Green World-not with its revolutionary ener- 
gies but with its natural processes. Her portrayal evokes the fecund 
female imago which has been missing in the depiction of the Green 
World. This theme culminates in her abandonment of the Glass 
World to bear and raise her child in the Green World-the one 
successful act of defiance in the novel. 0-09's instinctive determina- 
tion to live by the values of familial and generational love offers the 
novel's only response to both its absurd worlds. But the structural 
antitheses which lie at its center remain untouched by her portrayal. 
A more significant resolution occurs in the fact of the journal 
itself. Through his daily entries, D-503, in the Romantic role of the 11
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artist/maker as mediator, attempts to create order out of increasing 
disarray and suffuses the two worlds he describes with his own 
sensibility. As if he were also the most modern of novelists, he makes 
the story of his growth and development as an "artist" the story of his 
paradoxical worlds as well. In this narrative, these worlds are held in 
the most delicate balance by the mediating power of his language. 
D-503's use of language offers the reader a synthesis denied in 
character and plot. From the opening entry, in which he constructs a 
metaphor for his diarist's task out of the fundamental experience of 
pregnancy, his reliance on figurative language becomes a compelling 
mediator between the seemingly implacable oppositions of reason 
and emotion, Glass World and Green World. His evocations of the 
World of Reason gain their vividness-indeed their power for the 
reader-through this figurative language, where frequently organic 
and geometric metaphors slice across each other, conveying on the 
rhetorical level a synthesis denied elsewhere. D's syntax, punctuated 
as it is by ellipses and interrogatives, insistently directs the reader to 
the very synthesis which eludes him. Finally, permeating such 
rhetorical devices is the tone of the journal. By relying on a 
vocabulary laden with affective connotations, D's journal becomes, 
in toto, his emotional response to the complicated pressures of his life 
and his world. Such a preoccupation ignores ideology and transcends 
obdurate dichotomies. 
The distinctiveness of D's style proclaims a powerful individual- 
ity which forces the reader to care about what happens to its creator. 
Even as he chronicles his happy submission to the Glass World and 
his tortured submission to I-330-in fact in the very act of recording 
these willful diminutions for his readers-he asserts the primacy of 
the self through a style which insists on the very individuation he 
elsewhere denies. 
It is significant, then, that D's language changes abruptly after 
he undergoes the Operation. The last entry, as he himself observes, 
contains "No delirium, no absurd metaphors, no feeling: nothing but 
facts" (p. 231). The linguistic flatness, even linearity of this entry 
reflects the defeat attending his narrative and underscores his own 
descent into stasis. Nevertheless, neither the narrative's end nor its 
tone brings similar defeat to the reader. For in addition to the ironies 
previously discussed, we as audience are left with the last irony, that 
the very distinctions available to us but inaccessible to the protagonists 
allow us our own syntheses. This affective resolution suggests at once 
the limitations of the dystopic novel and some of the strengths of We. 12
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We know what is wrong in both the worlds of We, or we can know 
if we look closely at the conflicts as the novel presents them. But if we 
accept too readily the simplicities of categorization, we risk losing 
sight of the novel's complexity. With its multiple layers of irony and 
its seemingly romantic opposition to the entropic tendencies of 
systematic thought, We offers us, as no dystopic novel can, the 
central contradiction of the modern experience, the failure of order to 
sustain life and the failure of energy to sustain purpose. For as a form 
of satire, the dystopic novel is limited in what it may say to us; it may 
show us what could happen to our civic lives and suggest what ought 
to be. But works like We, that seek out the deeper contradictions of 
our fundamental drives for order or for chaos, for passion or for love, 
are not simply satiric and only appear to be dystopic. These works 
draw on the full range of mythic and ethical structures imbedded 
within our common experience to produce intimations of what is, 
rather than premonitions of what ought to be. 
NOTES 
1. See, for instance, Gordon Browning, "Zamiatin's We: An Anti-Utopian 
Classic," Cithara, 7, No. 2 (1968), 13-20, and "Toward a Set of Standards for 
Everlasting Anti-Utopian Fiction," Cithara, 10, No. 1 (1970),18 -32; D. J. Richards, 
Zamyatin: A Soviet Heretic (New York: Hillary House, 1962), p. 68; Jurgen Ruble, 
Literature and Revolution: A Study of the Writer and Communism in the Twentieth 
Century, trans. and ed. Jean Steinburg (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 37-38; Marc 
Slonim, "Evgeny Zamyatin: The Ironic Dissident," Soviet Russian Literature: 
Writers and Problems (New York: Oxford, 1964), pp. 80-89; and George 
Woodcock, "Utopias in Negative," Sewanee Review, 64 (1956), 81-97. 
2. Northrop Frye, "The Drunken Boat: The Revolutionary Element in Romanti- 
, cism," in The Stubborn Structure (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), 
p. 203. 
3. Yevgeny Zamyatin, We, trans. Mirra Ginsburg (1923; rpt. New York: Viking, 
1972), p. 14. All references to the text will be taken from this edition. 
4. Because we see 1-330 only through the eyes of the smitten D, and because 
significant portions of her life seem to occur just out of his purview, she remains an 
elusive figure, especially concerning her feelings for D. For a negative view of her see 
Christopher Collins, "Z amyatin's We as Myth," SEEJ, 10 (1966),125 -33; a positive 
interpretation is Richards', p. 61. See also Owen Ulph, "1-330: Reconsiderations on 
the Sex of Satan," RLT, 9 (1974), 262-75. 13
Mikesell and Suggs: Zamyatin's We and the Idea of the Dystopie
Published by New Prairie Press
102 STCL, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Fall, 1982) 
5. Northrop Frye, A Natural Perspective: The Development of Shakespearean 
Comedy and Romance (New York: Harcourt, 1965), pp. 118, 127. 
6. For discussions of We as a dystopic novel, see Edward J. Brown, Russian 
Literature Since the Revolution (New York: Collier Books, 1969), pp. 75, 82; Irving 
Howe, "The Fiction of Anti-Utopia," New Republic, 146, No. 17 (1962), 13-16; 
Juan Lopez-Morillas, "Utopia and Anti-Utopia: From 'Dreams of Reason' to 
`Dreams of Unreason,' " Survey, 82, No. 1 (1972), 57-61; Alex M. Shane, The Life 
and Works of Evgenij Zamyatin (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1968), p. 141; 
Boris Thomson, The Premature Revolution: Russian Literature and Society, 1917- 
1946 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p. 17; Woodcock, p. 90. 
7. Even seen in the light of scientific enthusiasms contemporary to the period of 
We's composition, the Green World offers no counter-utopia to the Glass World. In 
the ten years following the Russian revolution, Soviet scientists attempted to reconcile 
the provisions of Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity to the philosophy of science 
they were forming out of the premises of dialectical materialism. The Special Theory 
seemed to argue successfully for the application of the already recognized laws of the 
relativity of physical motion to energy as well as to matter. Thus the physical world 
had, at least operationally, to include both. 
When one applies the principles of dialectics to this universe, new possibilities of 
order arise. Matter and energy constitute a thesis-antithesis opposition, different 
stages of existence of the same material. In We, the world of fixed matter is clearly the 
immutable Glass World, a post-entropic state in which all energy has reached equili- 
brium and stasis grips life. The Green World, on the other hand, is portrayed as the 
world of energy. It is volatile and filled with potential for change and exchange. 
The novel allows only two options for the disposition of this dichotomy: the 
absorption of all energy by the One State or the obliteration of stasis by Nature. 
However, the principle of the dialectic would provide the philosopher of Zamyatin's 
Russia with a third solution not available in the novel: the appearance of a synthesis, a 
"new" world, matter transformed and revitalized by energy, "Nature nurtured" by 
reason. Thus, although the novel recognizes the new conceptual universe of the 
Einsteinian age, it rejects both synthesis and the Special Theory. 
8. Frye, Stubborn Structure, pp. 34, 109. 
9. Evgenij Zamyatin: An Interpretive Study (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), p. 49. 
10. For discussion of the dialectical aspects of We, see D. J. Richards, p. 59; 
Thomson, p. 17; Alex Shane, "Introduction: Zamyatin the Critic," pp. xv-xvi and 
Zamyatin's essay, "Tomorrow," pp. 51-52, in A Soviet Heretic: Essays by Yevgeny 
Zamyatin, ed. and trans. Mirra Ginsburg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1970). 14
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 8
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol7/iss1/8
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1117
